liberation support movement
interview

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member of mpla comité director

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LIBERATION SUPPORT MOVEMENT

INTERVIEW [with]

DANIEL CHIPENDA

This interview with Daniel Chipenda was taped in Lusaka, Zambia, on 28 August, 1969 by LSM Liaison Secretary Don Barnett.

Daniel Chipenda is currently a member of MPLA's Comite Director (Steering Committee) and one of four men on the Presidential Commission. He is responsible for, among other things, Information and Publicity.

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

Semi-liberated areas

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QUESTION: In February, 1968, the MPLA announced its intention to move its headquarters from Brazzaville to Angola. How much progress have you made since then toward achieving this objective?

CHIPENDA: I think we have made much concrete progress toward this objective of moving our Steering Committee from Brazzaville to Angola. But our headquarters is not in one particular place. As you know, we are fighting in five large regions and, up to this time, we face a very great difficulty in coordinating our activities in these regions. We have not yet solved all the problems of communication. So, while all Steering Committee members are now working inside the country, they are not in one place. They are separated. If you visit Angola again you will find members of our Steering Committee in every region.

In addition, we have formed a Presidential Commission made up of the President and three deputies, including myself and Comrade Monimambu, who are responsible for the coordination of MPLA activities in all regions where our forces are operating. To do this work we have to move around, both inside and outside the country. That is why you can find me sometimes in Lusaka, or in Dar es Salaam, or in Angola. Right now President Neto is in the 2nd Region, in Cabinda, and Commander Monimambu and myself have just returned from the 3rd or Eastern Region.

QUESTION: In March last year, when I interviewed Commander Monimambu, MPLA guerrillas were operating in three regions. How much progress in the military sphere have you made since that time?

CHIPENDA: Yes, Comrade Monimambu said last year that we were operating in three regions; and that was correct. But since that time we have opened two new regions: the 4th, including Lunda and Malange districts, and the 5th, including Bié, Huambo, Benguela and Cuando do Sul. This 5th Region starts in Bié and goes west right to the sea. Both these new fronts are now very active and, as you know, are very important in the overall struggle. They are also of great economic importance for the Portuguese and their imperialist partners. Lunda, for example, in northeastern Angola, contains the rich foreign-owned diamond mines (DIAMANG); and in Malange, also in the 4th Region, there is a very important railway which links this area to Luanda on the coast. The 5th Region is also very important. It is the most heavily populated region in Angola, with many Portuguese settlers, and is rich in agriculture. Our military activities in this region are sure to make the life of the Portuguese colonialists very difficult.

In the 1st Region, in northwest Angola, our comrades have made good progress even though they still can't get supplies of ammunition, medicines, and so on, from the outside. The Portuguese admit they have suffered serious losses in this region and in the past few weeks they have been very embarrassed by our activities. This is a very important coffee-growing area and MPLA guerrilla operations are preventing the settlers from maintaining high levels of production. Our comrades there are attacking the economic base of Portuguese colonialism and, despite difficulties, have become almost completely self-reliant.

In addition to progress in the countryside, comrades in the 1st Region have also been successful in organizing clandestine groups in the city and today we have many strong groups in Luanda. The recent hijacking of a Portuguese plane by three of our militants (we now call them "Heroic Militants of MPLA") is some indication of the level of clandestine organization we have achieved in Luanda.

In the 2nd Region we have also made progress but, as you know, we face certain difficulties there. Most of Cabinda is mountainous with thick tropical forest and the population of 60,000 lives mainly near the coast. They are not as bad off as people in the rest of Angola and the Portuguese have had some success with the traitor Taty - who used to be a minister in Roberto's GRAE - in building a counter-revolutionary puppet movement. Nevertheless, we have recently destroyed several Portuguese posts, such as Niconji and Mgonji which the enemy has been forced to abandon, and have developed the struggle in Cabinda beyond what it was last year.

In the 3rd Region we have reached a new stage of struggle. In Moxico and Cuando-Cubango we control large areas where the enemy never appears and has virtually stopped moving on the ground. The Portuguese stay in their few posts and barracks and, meanwhile, we are consolidating our position and organizing the people. During this new stage of the struggle in the 3rd Region, our objective is to force the Portuguese out and establish a fully liberated base area. This will be very valuable for us in other regions, where we are still in the first stage of struggle.

QUESTION: Isn't another region, the 6th Region, being opened in the southwestern districts of the

country?

CHIPENDA: I can't say that we have already opened this 6th Region, but it is our intention to do so in the very near future.

QUESTION: In how many of Angola's 15 districts are MPLA guerrillas now active?

CHIPENDA: MPLA detachments are now fighting in 10 of the 15 districts.

QUESTION: At the First Eastern Regional Conference held in Zone "C" in August, 1968, it was announced that MPLA was planning to establish a vanguard party and to expand its military activities from guerrilla to regular or mobile warfare. Perhaps you could comment on the progress made toward achieving these objectives.

CHIPENDA: Regarding the military question, we can divide our struggle so far into two stages. In the 3rd region we face the second stage; we are still in the first stage in the other regions. Until recently, our big problem in the 3rd Region was getting material equipment sufficient to organize regular units. But now we have solved some of these problems and are able to put into practice the decision taken at the Conference. We consider the 3rd Region the base for our struggle in the 4th, 5th and 6th Regions. If we can destroy the posts and barracks of the colonialists in the 3rd Region, we will have a good base for organizing regular units and advancing the struggle to a higher stage in the other regions where, meanwhile, guerrilla warfare must continue.

But this effort cannot be allowed to consume all our energies. We are sure we can't destroy the enemy merely by over-running his posts and bar-

racks in the 3rd Region. We believe it more important at this point to further generalize the struggle in Angola and force an increasing dispersal of Portuguese troops. After generalizing the struggle it will be easier to organize regular army units and mobile warfare in those regions where conditions are favorable. We will also be able to defend our base areas and prevent the Portuguese from re-occupying positions we have destroyed. Being dispersed, they will be unable to concentrate sufficient forces. When we have succeeded in generalizing the struggle throughout Angola, the Portuguese will be hard-pressed to protect those areas where they have vital economic interests. At that time, it will be easy for us to fully implement the decisions reached at the 1st Eastern Regional Conference.

QUESTION: Comrade Monimambu said last year that because of MPLA's shortage of certain kinds of weapons and ammunition, it was difficult to do more than engage in harassing action against Portuguese posts and barracks. This problem of supply would seem to become greater as you generalize the struggle, since you will have to arm and equip an increasing number of detachments. Does MPLA now feel a pressure to move toward mobile warfare, to concentrate larger forces in order to generate a greater internal supply of arms, ammunition and other military equipment?

CHIPENDA: Our primary intention is to become self-reliant, to take arms and other equipment which we need from the enemy. That is why the tactic of concentrating superior forces, of over-running enemy positions, so as to increase or replenish our store of arms and ammunition is very important to us. But strategically, in order to carry out these annihilation tactics successfully in many regions, it is necessary to generalize the struggle. It will then be difficult for the Portuguese

to support or defend their outposts in the semi-liberated regions or to launch large offensives against our base areas. At the same time it will become increasingly easy for us to organize regular units and over-run Portuguese posts and barracks in many parts of the country at the same time.

As you know, Angola is a very big country; and we must take advantage of this. If we prematurely concentrate our forces in one or two regions, it will be very difficult for us. Last year we had such an experience and learned a great deal from it. The Portuguese launched a dry-season offensive against some of our bases, especially in Zone "A" of the 3rd Region. They knew many of our forces were in the 3rd Region, so they concentrated their forces from the 3rd and 1st Regions and launched a very large offensive to destroy our bases. Fortunately, their offensive failed. After the heavy enemy air attack on the Zone "C" base camp where, as you know, Dr. Boavida was killed, we suspected the Portuguese were planning something. We quickly changed our tactics and deployment of forces and turned the Portuguese offensive into another defeat for them. But at the same time, this experience taught us again the great need to generalize the struggle. We believe this is a normal development in people's war. After we have achieved this objective it will be very easy for us to launch a strategic counter-offensive. At that point, after generalizing the struggle, we will be stronger than the Portuguese. The whole people will rise with us and we will achieve a favorable balance of forces.

Regarding supplies, the problem is complex and depends on several factors. Outside supplies are most important for bases near the borders of

friendly countries, where problems of transportation are not so great. But deep inside the country, outside supplies do not play such an important part. For example, in the 1st Region we've sent in only one group with weapons and ammunition over the last two years. But these MPLA detachments are still fighting. Where are they getting their arms and ammunition? From the enemy, of course. This is the only way, because it is extremely difficult for our people in Luanda and Cuanza Norte to bring equipment in from Congo Kinshasa. As we push further into Bié, into Sá da Bandeira, and so on, it will also be difficult to bring in supplies from Zambia or Congo, some 500 or 600 miles away. We will have to solve our problems of supply from the inside. We think this is the only way, and this is what we are doing.

Although we are on the strategic defensive, we have succeeded in maintaining tactical initiative and in extending the sphere of our military and political operations. The Portuguese have been unable to stop our generalization of the struggle, and we don't think they can stop it. Before 1966, we were only operating in the 1st and 2nd Regions. In 1966, we opened the 3rd Region and by the end of 1967, this region was extended to the whole of Moxico and Cuando-Cubango districts. Last year, we opened two new regions, the 4th and 5th, and maybe tomorrow we will open the 6th Region in Huila or Moçamedes. In this sense, we are on the offensive.

In Vietnam, soon after they began their struggle, they analyzed the stages their war would pass through. We can see this in the book, Resistência Vencera. In MPLA, we are also very concerned with studying and determining the strategic stages through which our struggle must pass. We think this is necessary. We believe that to achieve

the last stage of the struggle, the strategic offensive, we must generalize the struggle throughout the country. We must use many different tactics to achieve this objective. We are sure the people are ready to fight and that, soon, MPLA forces will be active in all 15 Angola districts.

QUESTION: The peoples of the 3rd Region, a very backward and oppressed area, exported considerable labor to the mines of South and South-West Africa. From what I have been able to learn, they were quite ready to support the revolutionary movement in 1966. Have you found the more densely populated Ovimbundu in Bié, and the Lunda in the 4th Region, as ready to join the struggle?

CHIPENDA: Experience has taught us that as the struggle develops we learn more and more about the ways to carry on and advance the struggle. For example, in Cabinda, when we started in 1964, we began fighting along the border and then moved inside. But here in the 3rd Region: No! We learned from experience, from our differences in Cabinda, and went immediately inside the country. Again, in the beginning we sometimes put more emphasis on the military than on the political side of the struggle. We had to learn that political work, political education, is very important in mobilizing the people to join and support the armed struggle.

Now to your question. We have learned from experience in the 3rd Region and are pleased with the work our militants are doing among the peoples of the 4th and 5th Regions. But also, we have to analyze each region separately and, where there are differences, we have to employ special methods and tactics to bring the people into the struggle. The social structure and style of life

of the Luanda and Chokwe people of the 4th Region, for example, are very different from what we found among the Mbunda, Luchazi, Luena, etc., in the 3rd Region. The people in the 4th Region have a generally better attitude toward work; they like to work, while traditionally the people of the 3rd Region didn't like to work very hard. So we have been able to organize and mobilize the peoples of the 4th Region on a much higher level than so far we have been able to achieve in the 3rd Region.

QUESTION: I would imagine the 5th Region is strategically very important, since it contains a quarter of Angola's total population. Have you found the Ovimbundu people ready to join the struggle?

CHIPENDA: Absolutely, absolutely; we are sure of that. I myself am Umbundu, and I know how the Ovimbundu have struggled both in the past and right up to now. We have had several chiefs, such as Kandimba and Mutuya-Kevela in 1902, who became famous by leading the people against the Portuguese colonialists. But sometimes our Angolan people themselves are confused; they think the Ovimbundu have been favored by the Portuguese, are more trusted by the Portuguese, and so on. I don't think this is correct. The oppression was always very great in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and the other Umbundu areas. Hundreds of thousands have been sent to forced labor. Even today there are more Ovimbundu working on "contract labor" than any other people in Angola. In Luanda, for example, it is difficult to find contract laborers from the eastern districts or from Cuanza Norte. Most of the contract labor on the farms, even in the north, are Ovimbundu people. The Portuguese try to convince the Ovimbundu that they are better off than other Angolan peoples,

that life isn't so bad, etc., but I think this has failed; all the Ovimbundu know they must now fight.

QUESTION: Wasn't there a good deal of repression carried out by the Portuguese in the Umbundu region after the struggle began in 1961?

CHIPENDA: Absolutely. That is one reason why I believe these people will join us in the struggle. Many of them, of course, are already fighting and, in MPLA, several Ovimbundu hold responsible positions. Last year the Poruguese started to transfer some settlers in Huambo and Bié from their farms to the towns. They are afraid, because this is the most populated area of Angola and the people there are identified with the guerrilla struggle. It will be difficult for the Portuguese because the Angolan people are living in the same areas as the settlers. If they try to burn and bomb as they have in the 3rd Region they will endanger their own people as well as ours. The only thing they can do is to remove the settlers from the area, but this is also a very big problem for them.

QUESTION: As the armed struggle penetrates deeper into the Umbundu and Kimbundu areas, do you think the Portuguese will be forced to pull back their forces to try and protect the highly settled European areas and important economic interests, making it easier for MPLA units to destroy enemy outposts in the other regions?

CHIPENDA: That is the usual tactic in counter-guerrilla warfare. The enemy tries to clearly separate the areas it controls from the regions of the guerrilla forces, and then to put their advanced posts in the guerrilla zones in order to pacify the population, counter-attack the guerril-

la forces, and so on. That is what the French tried to do against the FLN in Algeria, and what the United States is trying to do in Vietnam. So we think this is what the Portuguese will attempt to do in Angola.

QUESTION: MPLA has initiated several programs for the civilian population within Angola's semi-liberated regions. Perhaps you could comment on recent developments in the fields of medicine, education, economics and political organization.

CHIPENDA: I think we have made progress in all these areas. This year we have more doctors and more schools than last. Dr. Boavida, who was our only doctor, was killed in action last year, but now we have four young doctors working in the semi-liberated regions. Regarding our Centers for Revolutionary Instruction (CIR), last year we had only two - one in Zone "A" of the Eastern Region and another, started after the August Conference, in Zone "C". Now we have a CIR in the 4th Region and Comrade de Lolua, who I think you know, is preparing to open another in the 5th Region, in Bié, very soon.

We have progressed in other fields as well. In agriculture, for example, we have established a trade union which is responsible for organizing the population, helping the people choose the proper seeds, land, and so on, and introducing new forms of collective agriculture to replace the old traditional forms.

Last year we had militias, but they were poorly armed with spears, bows and arrows and axes. Now we have militias which are armed with rifles and other modern weapons, and they are also much better organized. This is one of our most important achievements, because now our people can

defend themselves against the enemy; the militias can protect the villagers when they go to work in their fields, fish in the rivers, and so on.

We have also made progress with the political organization of our people in the semi-liberated regions, with the establishment of organs of popular power. The Action Committees at the group and sector level have taken firm root among the people and are working well. All decisions at the local level are made by these committees and MPLA political organizers are there only to coordinate, to provide general orientation.

So, in general, we can say that our programs in the regions controlled by MPLA are progressing well.

QUESTION: Perhaps you could now comment on last year's decision by MPLA to try and create a vanguard party in addition to, or in place of, MPLA.

CHIPENDA: We made this decision last year so that we could organize our people better. We don't think it is only MPLA militants who are obliged to fight against Portuguese colonialism; all the people should be fighting, even those who are not MPLA members. That is what we hope to accomplish by organizing a party. The cadres of MPLA must demonstrate a new kind of discipline and comportment, different from that of ordinary MPLA members or non-MPLA supporters of the revolution. This is necessary if we are to organize a vanguard which, through its discipline, comportment and spirit of self-sacrifice, can gain acceptance among the people as the genuine revolutionary leadership.

We also think it is very important for our party to have a correct and clear ideology, in order to provide the general orientation for our

struggle. That is why in our CIR's, as you can see by the books I gave you, we are preparing our young militants with theoretical and ideological training - so that we will have the basis for building a vanguard party.

As you know, we are a liberation movement and we have to organize, to mobilize, all of the Angolan people against the Portuguese tyranny. We don't want to confuse things. As MPLA, our duty is to mobilize all the people, even those who may not at this time be interested in following the orientation of MPLA. The only thing they must accept is the basic correctness of the armed struggle for the liberation of Angola. As a national liberation movement we have to do this, but at the same time we aren't forgetting our decision of last year to form a vanguard party.

QUESTION: Are you saying that within MPLA, as a mass movement, there is a de facto party forming made up of the more militant members? An embryo vanguard within MPLA which, at the appropriate time, will formally constitute itself as a party?

CHIPENDA: That is the general idea, but let me explain further. When MPLA was formed we had already thought about creating such a party, a vanguard party within a united front of all progressive Angolan movements and forces. We tried to put this into practice, and if you read the MPLA Manifesto of 1956 you will find this is the kind of thinking. But problems arose, such as the splits which occurred in outside countries, such as Congo Kinshasa, and the intervention of imperialist forces in some of the Angolan liberation movements. So it was very difficult to form such a common front with the other liberation movements in which MPLA would be the vanguard. In fact, if we look at the history of the struggle over the

past several years we will see that developments toward such a front have been in a very different direction. The MPLA today, because it is the only movement struggling within the country, the only genuine representative of the popular struggle in Angola against colonialism and imperialism, is itself becoming a "united front" of all progressive forces and elements. Now the great majority of the people are in MPLA, or are supporters of MPLA, because they know that MPLA is the only movement which is fighting, which is defeating the Portuguese.

But many of these new MPLA members and supporters don't yet understand MPLA's programs or ideology. That is why we think it is very important to create the basis, the cadres, for a vanguard party which will provide the direction and general orientation for the people in our liberation movement. This is the reason we are trying to provide all our members with the possibility of studying and learning, of developing ideologically and politically. Those who reach a high level of political understanding and, more important, demonstrate a revolutionary character of discipline, good comportment and spirit of self-sacrifice will be selected to form such a vanguard party within MPLA.

QUESTION: Some people in North America, and perhaps in Europe also, are confused about the different ideological positions held by MPLA, UNITA and Roberto's GRAE. They hold the somewhat simplistic view that UNITA is a Chinese-oriented movement, that the GRAE is a puppet movement of the United States, and that MPLA is a Russian-oriented movement. Perhaps you could clarify your position on the issues involved here.

CHIPENDA: I think many people <u>are</u> confused now,

and this confusion arises from the very great division we are all facing today between China and Russia. We are sorry about these developments because for us, and for the other genuine liberation movements, there is no benefit at all from this kind of situation. The more important problem, however, is that it benefits imperialism. It allows the imperialists to sow the kind of confusion you mention, to intervene in the struggle so as to divide and weaken the liberation forces.

When people say the ideology of MPLA is Moscow-oriented and the ideology of UNITA is Peking-oriented, they not only help the imperialists confuse things, they are simply wrong. The divisions which have emerged within the Angolan liberation struggle have not come about because of the split between China and Russia. These divisions started in 1960, and in 1961 the MPLA was supported by both China and Russia. The Chinese continued to support MPLA in 1962, even after our first Conference in Congo Kinshasa when we expelled our general secretary, Viriato da Cruz, from the Steering Committee of MPLA. It was this man who went to China in order to spread his poison that MPLA was pro-Russia, anti-Chinese, and so on. This is when our difficulties with the Chinese comrades began.

But we want to make one point clear. MPLA does not blindly follow the ideology of any socialist country, either that of the Soviet Union or China. Our purpose is to defend our cause, which is the struggle against Portuguese colonialism. And it is the MPLA, the Angolan people within MPLA, who organize everything: we organize our military struggle, we organize our structure, we organize our political and civilian programs; and everything we do in our country we do according to our analysis of the real conditions of our struggle,

our country, and our people.

The main thing which separates the MPLA from puppet groups such as the GRAE and UNITA is that MPLA is concerned with the Angolan NATIONAL liberation movement, while these other groups are fighting to advance the cause of tribalism, regionalism and racialism. We don't see any significant differences between UNITA and Roberto's group, because their methods and their basic goals are the same. Within MPLA there is no division on this point: we all agree on the objective of unifying ALL of our people in order to struggle against Portuguese colonialism. If anyone wants to define this position in ideological terms, then let them go ahead - this is our position.

So the propaganda coming from the imperialist countries which links MPLA with the Russians, UNITA with the Chinese, and so on, is false. It just proves that the confusion within the socialist world benefits the imperialists, helps them foster divisions within liberation movements and also within some countries.

QUESTION: It is my impression from conversations with other MPLA comrades that there is no ill-feeling toward China, that there is no bias toward any particular position held by the Soviet Union, and that you would like fraternal relations with any country or movement which would be of benefit to your struggle in Angola.

CHIPENDA: Yes, that is our position.We have never attacked our comrades in China, and we can't. They have a right to their own position. But we know that our comrades in China will come to understand our position, and that they will change their position, because we know that China will never forget its responsibility to the struggle of the people.

We are struggling in our country; we are struggling against colonialism, against neocolonialism and against imperialism. So we believe it is the duty of the Chinese people to support and to help us in our struggle, and we are sure they will support our struggle. We never say we don't want the help or support of China. No! We need the support of the Chinese, we need it; and we want the Chinese to start immediately to support our struggle, to help us in all fields - just as we want and need the support of all socialist countries and of all progressive forces, even within the imperialist countries.

QUESTION: How do you view MPLA's role in the world-wide struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism?

CHIPENDA: We think that our revolution is part of the overall struggle against those who oppress the people. In Angola we are struggling against those who oppress the Angolan people and we call them colonialists. We think that by fighting against this colonialism, and giving our people the consciousness that we must fight against those who oppress the people, we are also participating in the struggle against neocolonialism and imperialism. We don't isolate these forms of oppression. We believe that we must fight for complete independence, and to achieve complete independence we must fight against colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism.

QUESTION: As each month goes by there seems to be more cooperation, more coordination of efforts, between the fascist regimes of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. Has this cooperation among counter-revolutionary forces fostered a greater cooperation among the various liberation movements in Southern Africa?

CHIPENDA: Yes, we know about this cooperation between Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, and we are ready to cooperate with our brothers who are fighting against the Smith and Vorster regimes. Because we think that the enemy is the same, because they cooperate with each other, we have to cooperate also. But our cooperation with the liberation movements in these areas is not the same as our cooperation with Frelimo and PAIGC. We are fighting against Portuguese colonialism, MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC, and we think that the cooperation between our three movements must be different than that between ourselves and the other comrades fighting in Rhodesia, South Africa and South-West Africa. Our enemy is identical in Angola, Mozambique and Guine, and he employs the same tactics against our three movements. Even the material support given by South Africa and Rhodesia to the Portuguese is fitted into these same tactics.

So, though we are prepared to cooperate with those comrades in southern Africa who are really struggling to liberate their countries, we must be clear about the fields in which we are to cooperate. We face a common enemy in southern Africa, but strategically our aim is to divide the enemy, to make him disperse his forces. We have not declared war against the regimes of Smith and Vorster; we have declared war against Portuguese colonialism, and our duty is to fight against Portugal. We support and cooperate with those movements in southern Africa which are fighting against the regimes which help Portugal. To the extent that they succeed in their struggles against the Smith and Vorster regimes, our common enemy will be divided and the strength of Portugal, in particular, reduced.

QUESTION: Portugal's NATO allies, particularly

West Germany, France and the United States, have acquired a much greater economic interest in Angola over the past few years. Given these increasingly rich mineral and fuel developments by foreign corporations, do you think Angola will become a great enough loss for the imperialist powers for them to create "another Vietnam" in your country?

CHIPENDA: We can never forget that such a possibility exists. We don't say Angola will become another Vietnam. We just say that whatever happens we are ready to continue fighting until we have fully liberated our country. We will never back down in our struggle and we are prepared to fight for as long as it is necessary. Right now we are fighting against Portugal and we are sure that we will win. The United States must know this. And even if they intervene with their armed forces, we are still sure of our victory. Perhaps it will not be Chipenda or my comrades who will win; we may not win in our time. But the people of Angola will surely win. Sometimes I think the imperialists take a very short view, without thinking about the future. All intelligent people know the Portuguese have no chance of holding on to their colonies in Africa - they have no chance. So if the imperialist corporations keep investing their capital in Angola and Mozambique, they must have some other objective in mind. But if they think we are prepared to become neocolonies of the United States, West Germany, and so on, they are very mistaken. MPLA and the people of Angola will continue fighting until we have achieved complete independence, political and economic. And in this struggle Vietnam is a very good example for us.

QUESTION: Recently, I believe in Dakar, Senegal, meetings were held between MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC

leaders. Have any changes, as a result of these talks, been made in the role of CONCP in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism? To what extent are MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC more closely coordinating their activities against the Portuguese in the present stage of the struggle?

CHIPENDA: The meetings you mention are very important, especially in the current situation. At present MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC are the only movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné which are recognized by the Liberation Committee of the OAU. This is important because it confirms that these movements are the only ones really fighting in our countries.

At the Dakar meetings we reviewed our whole structure in order to create a new one able to more effectively coordinate our struggles against Portuguese colonialism. Before, we had a Secretariat which worked in Algiers. But we changed that. Now the Secretariat will be located wherever the Presidents of the three movements are. For example, now the Secretariat is headed by the Frelimo President, so it is located in Dar es Salaam. MPLA people will work with the Frelimo President, but it is his responsibility to deal with the problems of coordinating the three movements within CONCP. Every six months the leaders of MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC will meet and the Secretariat of CONCP will rotate between the Presidents of the three movements. Next, it will be the President of MPLA, Dr. Neto, then Comrade Cabral of PAIGC. Our office in Algiers will serve from now on as the CONCP Bureau of Information, headed by our representatives there.

So now we can cooperate more effectively because we have built a stronger and more unified structure. We have decided to coordinate our activities in all fields of struggle: in the

military field, in education, in economics, information, and so on. For example, we will send comrades to Mozambique and to Guiné to study how they organize their schools, and they will come to Angola to see how we do these things. In the military field also, some of our commanders can go to Mozambique and Guiné, and they will come to Angola. Then we will be able to coordinate our stragegy and perhaps plan coordinated attacks against the Portuguese forces.

We also plan to launch a big international compaign to gain recognition of our movements as the only legitimate representatives of our peoples. We know that at some time the Portuguese will start to manoeuver in Angola, for example, in order to deal with some puppet organization. But if international opinion is strong in regarding MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC as the real representatives of our peoples in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné, then it will be extremely difficult for the Portuguese to negotiate with puppet groups such as the GRAE. Vietnam is a good example in this area. The fact that world opinion was so clear about the NLF being the only genuine representative of the south Vietnamese people, forced the United States to negotiate with the NLF in spite of their claims about the Saigon puppet regime. We believe international opinion is very important in any struggle, and have decided within CONCP to do everything we can to make our struggles known to the peoples of the world - to show them we are united and strong. From now on we will be putting out more joint statements, appearing together at conferences, and trying to get groups which support MPLA, for example, to support Frelimo and PAIGC as well.

We also decided at the Dakar meetings to coordinate our activities more closely with other

liberation movements in southern Africa. In South Africa we agreed to cooperate only with the ANC, in Zimbabwe with the ZAPU, and in Namibia, at present, with nobody. These were our decisions.

QUESTION: It seems that the anti-colonial struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné have now reached similar stages. Do you think that these changes in material conditions have fostered a greater unity between MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC?

CHIPENDA: Yes, we think so, we think so. Though there are some differences in our three struggles, we are all in the stage of generalizing the struggle throughout our countries. There have also been recent changes in Frelimo which have brought us closer together. At the last meeting of the Frelimo Central Committee they clearly decided to follow the orientation of class struggle and to combat tribalism and regionalism. Within CONCP there is now a single ideological orientation; not only for today, but also for tomorrow in Africa. We are sure of this. That is why we think it is very important to unify and strengthen our three organizations within CONCP.

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"Aims and Objectives"

"The major objectives of the LSM are (1) to provide concrete and substantial support, in the form of essential supplies, funds, technical assistance, publicity and information, to vanguard liberation forces fighting colonialism and neo-colonialism in the "countryside" of the U.S.-dominated imperialist system, and (2) to carry out rearguard anti-imperialist programs in the metropolitan centers of the empire so as to increase "urban" popular disaffection, further the moral isolation of the ruling-class regime, exacerbate the strategic military-manpower weakness of the establishment (reduce morale, tie down troops, etc.), expose the multinational corporate "mafia" and mobilize progressive metropolitan forces to support the armed spearhead of the anti-imperialist revolution in the "countryside".

"We believe that far too little practical and fraternal assistance has been given in support of National Liberation Movements by North Americans who are both capable and, in theory, desirous of providing such vitally needed support. The Liberation Support Movement was established in order to help resolve this glaring contradiction between theory and practice, between the potentiality and actuality of our own contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle.

"Within North America, vast human and material resources are at our disposal to serve the pressing needs of Imperialism's super-exploited masses in their just struggles to achieve genuine political, economic and cultural independence. Such struggles, and the peoples engaged in them, are in a very real sense our own. Though of different national, ethnic and linguistic groupings, we are all one people within the American Empire. The victories against exploitation and oppression achieved by our people in the "countryside" of the Empire serve to hasten the total destruction of the Imperialist System. They thus bring those of our people who dwell in the "metropole" of the American Empire closer to their own decisive victories and liberation."

LSM BRANCHES

P.O. Box 5776, Vancouver 12, B.C., Canada phone 604-278-2992

P.O. Box 814, Oakland, Calif. 94604, USA phone 415-841-0890

LSM INFORMATION CENTER

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Information Center
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